5th and 6th Amendment precedents (right to counsel and right to jury)
Amendment 5
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Amendment 6
Amendment 14
Trial by jury:
Hernandez v. Texas (1954)
Facts of the Case:
Pete Hernandez, an agricultural worker, was indicted for the murder of Joe Espinoza by an all-white grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. Claiming that Mexican Americans were barred from the jury commission that selected juries, and from petit juries, Hernandez's attorneys tried to quash the indictment. Moreover, Hernandez tried to quash the petit jury panel called for service, because persons of Mexican descent were excluded from jury service in this case. A Mexican American had not served on a jury in Jackson County in over 25 years and thus, Hernandez claimed that Mexican ancestry citizens were discriminated against as a special class in Jackson County. The trial court denied the motions. Hernandez was found guilty of murder and sentenced by the all-white jury to life in prison. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that "Mexicans are...members of and within the classification of the white race as distinguished from members of the Negro Race" and rejected the petitioners' argument that they were a "special class" under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the court pointed out that "so far as we are advised, no member of the Mexican nationality" challenged this classification as white or Caucasian.
Question:
Is it a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause to try a defendant of a particular race or ethnicity before a jury where all persons of his race or ancestry have, because of that race or ethnicity, been excluded by the state?
Conclusion:
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects those beyond the two classes of white or Negro, and extends to other racial groups in communities depending upon whether it can be factually established that such a group exists within a community. In reversing, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment "is not directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'" but in this case covers those of Mexican ancestry. This was established by the fact that the distinction between whites and Mexican ancestry individuals was made clear at the Jackson County Courthouse itself where "there were two men's toilets, one unmarked, and the other marked 'Colored Men and 'Hombres Aqui' ('Men Here')," and by the fact that no Mexican ancestry person had served on a jury in 25 years. Mexican Americans were a "special class" entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Duncan v. Louisiana (1968)
Facts of the Case:
Gary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white youth by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied.
Question:
Was the State of Louisiana obligated to provide a trial by jury in criminal cases such as Duncan's?
Conclusion:
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and that the states were obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such trials. Petty crimes, defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine, were not subject to the jury trial provision.
Williams v. Florida (1970)
Facts of the Case:
In 1967, the state of Florida passed legislation to allow six-member juries in criminal cases. Johnny Williams was tried and convicted for robbery by such a jury. Williams, lost in a Florida appellate court; he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Question:
Did a trial by jury of less than 12 persons violate the Sixth Amendment?
Conclusion:
No. The Court held that "the 12-man [jury] requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment." The Court found that the purpose of the jury trial was "to prevent oppression by the Government," and that the performance of this role was not dependent on the particular number of people on the jury. The Court concluded that "the fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance 'except to mystics.'"
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971)
Facts of the Case:
These cases involve juveniles brought to trial without a jury. The first involves Joseph McKeiver and Edward Terry, fifteen- and sixteen-year-old boys charged with acts of robbery, theft, assault, and escape. At trial before the Juvenile Court of Philadelphia, each was denied a request for a jury trial. A superior court affirmed the order and, after consolidation of their cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did likewise, saying there was no constitutional right to a jury trial for juveniles. In re Burrus concerns the consolidated cases of more than forty juveniles ranging in age from eleven to fifteen. Most of the juveniles faced misdemeanor charges stemming from protests of school consolidations that took place in November and December, 1968, during which, on six different occasions, they blocked traffic and refused to clear the roadway. Additionally, one sixteen-year-old juvenile faced charges of disorderly conduct for an incident that occurred at the local school. In each case, the judge denied a request for a jury trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina both affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no constitutional requirement for a jury trial for juvenile defendants.
Question:
Does the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as applied to the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, apply to juveniles?
Conclusion:
No. In a 6-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court concluded that the previous application of other criminal rights to juveniles, like rights to counsel and cross-examination, was done out of an emphasis on fact-finding. "But one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate fact-finding." Additionally, the Court noted that, because juvenile prosecution is not considered either civil or criminal, the whole of the Sixth Amendment does not necessarily apply. As such, there is no requirement for a jury trial in juvenile cases.
Apodaca v. Oregon (1972)
Facts of the Case:
Apodaca and two other defendants were convicted of assault, burglary, and grand larceny before three separate juries, all of which returned verdicts which were less than unanimous. Two of the cases were 11-1 and the other was 10-2 in favor of conviction.
Question:
Is a defendant's right to a trial by jury in a criminal case in a state court (as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments) violated if the accused is convicted by a less-than-unanimous jury?
Conclusion:
No. In a close decision the Court found that the accused's right to a jury trial does not require that juries return unanimous decisions in order to convict. After reviewing the history and function of juries in American society, the Court held that the most important function of the jury is to provide "commonsense judgment" in evaluating the respective arguments of accused and accuser. Requiring unanimity would not necessarily contribute to this function. A distinction was drawn, however, between capital and non-capital crimes.
Burch v. Louisiana (1979)
Facts of the Case:
Burch was found guilty of showing obscene films by a non-unanimous six-member jury. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of two consecutive seven-month terms and fined him $1,000.
Question:
Does a conviction by a non unanimous six-member jury in a state criminal trial for a non-petty offense violate the right to a jury trial as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion:
Yes. Tracing the development of the Court's considerations of this issue, Justice Rehnquist indicated that Burch's case sat at the "intersection of our decisions concerning jury size and unanimity." Rehnquist relied on the Court's holding in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) and the practices in several of the states to find against convictions by non-unanimous juries of six members. Only two of the states that used six-member juries in trials for petty offenses allowed verdicts to be less than unanimous. This "near uniform judgment of the Nation" of the inappropriateness of this jury arrangement, argued Rehnquist, provided the Court with a "useful guide" in determining constitutionally allowable jury practices.
Batson v. Kentucky (1986)
Facts of the Case:
Batson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to throw out all four black persons in the jury pool, resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him.
Question:
Did the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude the four black people from the jury violate Batson's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws?
Conclusion:
Yes. Relying heavily on precedents set in Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama (1965), Justice Powell held that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors not only deprives the accused of important rights during a trial, but also is devastating to the community at large because it "undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Without identifying a "neutral" reason why the four black people should have been excluded from the jury, the prosecutor's actions were in violation of the Constitution.
J.E.B v. Alabama (1994)
Facts of the Case:
Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B. (the putative father). A jury awarded in favor of T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool.
Question:
Was the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely because of their gender a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bars the exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of their sex, just as it bars exclusion on the basis of race. "Gender-based classifications," wrote Justice Harry Blackmun for the majority, "require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." As a consequence, "Parties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias."
Right to counsel:
Powell v. Alabama (1932)
Facts of the Case:
Nine black youths--young, ignorant, and illiterate--were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: A total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear at the trial. This cases was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama.
Question:
Did the trials violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice.
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)
Facts of the Case:
Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo's lawyer sought unsuccessfully to consult with his client. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder.
Question:
Was Escobedo denied the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. Justice Goldberg, in his majority opinion, spoke for the first time of "an absolute right to remain silent." Escobedo had not been adequately informed of his consitutitonal right to remain silent rather than to be forced to incriminate himself. The case has lost authority as precedent, as the arguments in police interrogation and confession cases have shifted from the Sixth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment, emphasizing whether the appropriate warnings have been given and given correctly, and whether the right to remain silent has been waived.
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
Facts of the Case:
Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with a felony for breaking and entering. He lacked funds and was unable to hire a lawyer to prepare his defense. When he requested the court to appoint an attorney for him, the court refused, stating that it was only obligated to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases. Gideon defended himself in the trial; he was convicted by a jury and the court sentenced him to five years in a state prison.
Question:
Did the state court's failure to appoint counsel for Gideon violate his right to a fair trial and due process of law as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion:
Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that Gideon had a right to be represented by a court-appointed attorney and, in doing so, overruled its 1942 decision of Betts v. Brady. In this case the Court found that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel was a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, which should be made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black called it an "obvious truth" that a fair trial for a poor defendant could not be guaranteed without the assistance of counsel. Those familiar with the American system of justice, commented Black, recognized that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."
United States v. Wade (1967)
Facts of the Case:
Several weeks after a man was indicted for robbery of a federally insured bank and for conspiracy, he was placed in a lineup in which each person wore strips of tape on his face, as the robber allegedly had done, and, on direction, repeated words like those the robber allegedly had used. This was done without notice to his appointed counsel. Two bank employees identified respondent as the robber. At trial, when asked if the robber was in the courtroom, the employees identified the defendant. The prior lineup identifications were elicited on cross-examination. Urging that the conduct of the lineup violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the man filed a motion for acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the courtroom identifications. The trial court denied the motions, and the man was convicted. An appellate court reversed the decision, holding that, though there was no Fifth Amendment deprivation, the absence of counsel at the lineup denied respondent his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and required the grant of a new trial at which the in-court identifications of those who had made lineup identifications would be excluded.
Question:
1. Did the line up violate Wade's Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination? 2. Did the absence of counsel at the line up deprive him of his Sixth Amendment rights?
Conclusion:
1. No. 2. Yes. Neither the lineup itself nor anything required therein violated respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting his person for observation by witnesses and using his voice as an identifying physical characteristic involved no compulsion of the accused to give evidence of a testimonial nature against himself which is prohibited by that Amendment. However, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to counsel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well determine his fate and where the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial. The post-indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps as analyzing fingerprints and blood samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which respondent was entitled to the aid of counsel.
In re Gault (1967)
Facts of the Case:
Gerald Francis Gault, fifteen years old, was taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call. Gault had previously been placed on probation. The police did not leave notice with Gault's parents, who were at work, when the youth was arrested. After proceedings before a juvenile court judge, Gault was committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21.
Question:
Were the procedures used to commit Gault constitutionally legitimate under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
No. The Court held that the proceedings for juveniles had to comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. These requirements included adequate notice of charges, notification of both the parents and the child of the juvenile's right to counsel, opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination at the hearings, and adequate safeguards against self-incrimination. The Court found that the procedures used in Gault's case met none of these requirements.
United States v. Wade (1967)
Facts of the Case:
Several weeks after a man was indicted for robbery of a federally insured bank and for conspiracy, he was placed in a lineup in which each person wore strips of tape on his face, as the robber allegedly had done, and, on direction, repeated words like those the robber allegedly had used. This was done without notice to his appointed counsel. Two bank employees identified respondent as the robber. At trial, when asked if the robber was in the courtroom, the employees identified the defendant. The prior lineup identifications were elicited on cross-examination. Urging that the conduct of the lineup violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the man filed a motion for acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the courtroom identifications. The trial court denied the motions, and the man was convicted. An appellate court reversed the decision, holding that, though there was no Fifth Amendment deprivation, the absence of counsel at the lineup denied respondent his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and required the grant of a new trial at which the in-court identifications of those who had made lineup identifications would be excluded.
Question:
1. Did the line up violate Wade's Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination? 2. Did the absence of counsel at the line up deprive him of his Sixth Amendment rights?
Conclusion:
1. No. 2. Yes. Neither the lineup itself nor anything required therein violated respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting his person for observation by witnesses and using his voice as an identifying physical characteristic involved no compulsion of the accused to give evidence of a testimonial nature against himself which is prohibited by that Amendment. However, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to counsel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well determine his fate and where the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial. The post-indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps as analyzing fingerprints and blood samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which respondent was entitled to the aid of counsel.
Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972)
Facts of the Case:
Jon Argersinger was a homeless man charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor in Florida. The charge carried with it a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. During the bench trial in which he was convicted and sentenced to serve ninety days in jail, Argersinger was not represented by an attorney.
Question:
Do the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a right to counsel to defendants who are accused of committing misdemeanors?
Conclusion:
Yes. In Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) the Court found that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required states to provide an attorney to indigent defendants in cases involving serious crimes. In this case, a unanimous Court extended that right to cover defendants charged with misdemeanors who faced the possibility of a jail sentence. Justice Douglas's plurality opinion described the intricacies involved in misdemeanor charges and the danger that unrepresented defendants may fall victim to "assembly-line justice." Thus, in order to guarantee fairness in trials involving potential jail time, no matter how petty the charge, the Court found that the state was obligated to provide the accused with counsel.
Rasul v. Bush (2004)
Facts of the Case:
Four British and Australian citizens were captured by the American military in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The four men were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty"). The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision.
Question:
Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba?
Conclusion:
Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the degree of control exercised by the United States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the application of habeas corpus rights. Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th century English common law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in "all...dominions under the sovereign's control." Because the United States exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was irrelevant. Further, Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizenship status. The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as unconstitutional.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004)
Facts of the Case:
In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was arrested by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an "enemy combatant," and transfered to a military prison in Virginia. Frank Dunham, Jr., a defense attorney in Virginia, filed a petition to have Hamdi's case heard in federal district court there, first on his own and then for Hamdi's father, in an attempt to have Hamdi's detention declared unconstitutional. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to due process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the executive branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States "enemy combatants" and thus restrict their access to the court system. The district court ruled for Hamdi, telling the government to release him. On appeal, a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because "the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not." The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's "enemy combatant" determination.
Question:
Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to due process by holding him indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an executive branch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to executive branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant?"
Conclusion:
Yes and no. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by two additional justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant. Souter and Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress authorized Hamdi's detention. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Amendment 6
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Amendment 14
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Question: is there a right to a jury in civil cases? -- Edmonsen v. Leesville Concrete Company (1991)
Trial by jury:
Hernandez v. Texas (1954)
Facts of the Case:
Pete Hernandez, an agricultural worker, was indicted for the murder of Joe Espinoza by an all-white grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. Claiming that Mexican Americans were barred from the jury commission that selected juries, and from petit juries, Hernandez's attorneys tried to quash the indictment. Moreover, Hernandez tried to quash the petit jury panel called for service, because persons of Mexican descent were excluded from jury service in this case. A Mexican American had not served on a jury in Jackson County in over 25 years and thus, Hernandez claimed that Mexican ancestry citizens were discriminated against as a special class in Jackson County. The trial court denied the motions. Hernandez was found guilty of murder and sentenced by the all-white jury to life in prison. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that "Mexicans are...members of and within the classification of the white race as distinguished from members of the Negro Race" and rejected the petitioners' argument that they were a "special class" under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the court pointed out that "so far as we are advised, no member of the Mexican nationality" challenged this classification as white or Caucasian.
Question:
Is it a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause to try a defendant of a particular race or ethnicity before a jury where all persons of his race or ancestry have, because of that race or ethnicity, been excluded by the state?
Conclusion:
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects those beyond the two classes of white or Negro, and extends to other racial groups in communities depending upon whether it can be factually established that such a group exists within a community. In reversing, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment "is not directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'" but in this case covers those of Mexican ancestry. This was established by the fact that the distinction between whites and Mexican ancestry individuals was made clear at the Jackson County Courthouse itself where "there were two men's toilets, one unmarked, and the other marked 'Colored Men and 'Hombres Aqui' ('Men Here')," and by the fact that no Mexican ancestry person had served on a jury in 25 years. Mexican Americans were a "special class" entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Duncan v. Louisiana (1968)
Facts of the Case:
Gary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white youth by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied.
Question:
Was the State of Louisiana obligated to provide a trial by jury in criminal cases such as Duncan's?
Conclusion:
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and that the states were obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such trials. Petty crimes, defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine, were not subject to the jury trial provision.
Williams v. Florida (1970)
Facts of the Case:
In 1967, the state of Florida passed legislation to allow six-member juries in criminal cases. Johnny Williams was tried and convicted for robbery by such a jury. Williams, lost in a Florida appellate court; he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Question:
Did a trial by jury of less than 12 persons violate the Sixth Amendment?
Conclusion:
No. The Court held that "the 12-man [jury] requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment." The Court found that the purpose of the jury trial was "to prevent oppression by the Government," and that the performance of this role was not dependent on the particular number of people on the jury. The Court concluded that "the fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance 'except to mystics.'"
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971)
Facts of the Case:
These cases involve juveniles brought to trial without a jury. The first involves Joseph McKeiver and Edward Terry, fifteen- and sixteen-year-old boys charged with acts of robbery, theft, assault, and escape. At trial before the Juvenile Court of Philadelphia, each was denied a request for a jury trial. A superior court affirmed the order and, after consolidation of their cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did likewise, saying there was no constitutional right to a jury trial for juveniles. In re Burrus concerns the consolidated cases of more than forty juveniles ranging in age from eleven to fifteen. Most of the juveniles faced misdemeanor charges stemming from protests of school consolidations that took place in November and December, 1968, during which, on six different occasions, they blocked traffic and refused to clear the roadway. Additionally, one sixteen-year-old juvenile faced charges of disorderly conduct for an incident that occurred at the local school. In each case, the judge denied a request for a jury trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina both affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no constitutional requirement for a jury trial for juvenile defendants.
Question:
Does the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as applied to the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, apply to juveniles?
Conclusion:
No. In a 6-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court concluded that the previous application of other criminal rights to juveniles, like rights to counsel and cross-examination, was done out of an emphasis on fact-finding. "But one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate fact-finding." Additionally, the Court noted that, because juvenile prosecution is not considered either civil or criminal, the whole of the Sixth Amendment does not necessarily apply. As such, there is no requirement for a jury trial in juvenile cases.
Apodaca v. Oregon (1972)
Facts of the Case:
Apodaca and two other defendants were convicted of assault, burglary, and grand larceny before three separate juries, all of which returned verdicts which were less than unanimous. Two of the cases were 11-1 and the other was 10-2 in favor of conviction.
Question:
Is a defendant's right to a trial by jury in a criminal case in a state court (as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments) violated if the accused is convicted by a less-than-unanimous jury?
Conclusion:
No. In a close decision the Court found that the accused's right to a jury trial does not require that juries return unanimous decisions in order to convict. After reviewing the history and function of juries in American society, the Court held that the most important function of the jury is to provide "commonsense judgment" in evaluating the respective arguments of accused and accuser. Requiring unanimity would not necessarily contribute to this function. A distinction was drawn, however, between capital and non-capital crimes.
Burch v. Louisiana (1979)
Facts of the Case:
Burch was found guilty of showing obscene films by a non-unanimous six-member jury. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of two consecutive seven-month terms and fined him $1,000.
Question:
Does a conviction by a non unanimous six-member jury in a state criminal trial for a non-petty offense violate the right to a jury trial as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion:
Yes. Tracing the development of the Court's considerations of this issue, Justice Rehnquist indicated that Burch's case sat at the "intersection of our decisions concerning jury size and unanimity." Rehnquist relied on the Court's holding in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) and the practices in several of the states to find against convictions by non-unanimous juries of six members. Only two of the states that used six-member juries in trials for petty offenses allowed verdicts to be less than unanimous. This "near uniform judgment of the Nation" of the inappropriateness of this jury arrangement, argued Rehnquist, provided the Court with a "useful guide" in determining constitutionally allowable jury practices.
Batson v. Kentucky (1986)
Facts of the Case:
Batson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to throw out all four black persons in the jury pool, resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him.
Question:
Did the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude the four black people from the jury violate Batson's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws?
Conclusion:
Yes. Relying heavily on precedents set in Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama (1965), Justice Powell held that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors not only deprives the accused of important rights during a trial, but also is devastating to the community at large because it "undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Without identifying a "neutral" reason why the four black people should have been excluded from the jury, the prosecutor's actions were in violation of the Constitution.
J.E.B v. Alabama (1994)
Facts of the Case:
Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B. (the putative father). A jury awarded in favor of T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool.
Question:
Was the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely because of their gender a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bars the exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of their sex, just as it bars exclusion on the basis of race. "Gender-based classifications," wrote Justice Harry Blackmun for the majority, "require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." As a consequence, "Parties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias."
Right to counsel:
Powell v. Alabama (1932)
Facts of the Case:
Nine black youths--young, ignorant, and illiterate--were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: A total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear at the trial. This cases was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama.
Question:
Did the trials violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice.
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)
Facts of the Case:
Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo's lawyer sought unsuccessfully to consult with his client. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder.
Question:
Was Escobedo denied the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. Justice Goldberg, in his majority opinion, spoke for the first time of "an absolute right to remain silent." Escobedo had not been adequately informed of his consitutitonal right to remain silent rather than to be forced to incriminate himself. The case has lost authority as precedent, as the arguments in police interrogation and confession cases have shifted from the Sixth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment, emphasizing whether the appropriate warnings have been given and given correctly, and whether the right to remain silent has been waived.
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
Facts of the Case:
Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with a felony for breaking and entering. He lacked funds and was unable to hire a lawyer to prepare his defense. When he requested the court to appoint an attorney for him, the court refused, stating that it was only obligated to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases. Gideon defended himself in the trial; he was convicted by a jury and the court sentenced him to five years in a state prison.
Question:
Did the state court's failure to appoint counsel for Gideon violate his right to a fair trial and due process of law as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion:
Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that Gideon had a right to be represented by a court-appointed attorney and, in doing so, overruled its 1942 decision of Betts v. Brady. In this case the Court found that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel was a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, which should be made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black called it an "obvious truth" that a fair trial for a poor defendant could not be guaranteed without the assistance of counsel. Those familiar with the American system of justice, commented Black, recognized that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."
United States v. Wade (1967)
Facts of the Case:
Several weeks after a man was indicted for robbery of a federally insured bank and for conspiracy, he was placed in a lineup in which each person wore strips of tape on his face, as the robber allegedly had done, and, on direction, repeated words like those the robber allegedly had used. This was done without notice to his appointed counsel. Two bank employees identified respondent as the robber. At trial, when asked if the robber was in the courtroom, the employees identified the defendant. The prior lineup identifications were elicited on cross-examination. Urging that the conduct of the lineup violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the man filed a motion for acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the courtroom identifications. The trial court denied the motions, and the man was convicted. An appellate court reversed the decision, holding that, though there was no Fifth Amendment deprivation, the absence of counsel at the lineup denied respondent his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and required the grant of a new trial at which the in-court identifications of those who had made lineup identifications would be excluded.
Question:
1. Did the line up violate Wade's Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination? 2. Did the absence of counsel at the line up deprive him of his Sixth Amendment rights?
Conclusion:
1. No. 2. Yes. Neither the lineup itself nor anything required therein violated respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting his person for observation by witnesses and using his voice as an identifying physical characteristic involved no compulsion of the accused to give evidence of a testimonial nature against himself which is prohibited by that Amendment. However, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to counsel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well determine his fate and where the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial. The post-indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps as analyzing fingerprints and blood samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which respondent was entitled to the aid of counsel.
In re Gault (1967)
Facts of the Case:
Gerald Francis Gault, fifteen years old, was taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call. Gault had previously been placed on probation. The police did not leave notice with Gault's parents, who were at work, when the youth was arrested. After proceedings before a juvenile court judge, Gault was committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21.
Question:
Were the procedures used to commit Gault constitutionally legitimate under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
No. The Court held that the proceedings for juveniles had to comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. These requirements included adequate notice of charges, notification of both the parents and the child of the juvenile's right to counsel, opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination at the hearings, and adequate safeguards against self-incrimination. The Court found that the procedures used in Gault's case met none of these requirements.
United States v. Wade (1967)
Facts of the Case:
Several weeks after a man was indicted for robbery of a federally insured bank and for conspiracy, he was placed in a lineup in which each person wore strips of tape on his face, as the robber allegedly had done, and, on direction, repeated words like those the robber allegedly had used. This was done without notice to his appointed counsel. Two bank employees identified respondent as the robber. At trial, when asked if the robber was in the courtroom, the employees identified the defendant. The prior lineup identifications were elicited on cross-examination. Urging that the conduct of the lineup violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the man filed a motion for acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the courtroom identifications. The trial court denied the motions, and the man was convicted. An appellate court reversed the decision, holding that, though there was no Fifth Amendment deprivation, the absence of counsel at the lineup denied respondent his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and required the grant of a new trial at which the in-court identifications of those who had made lineup identifications would be excluded.
Question:
1. Did the line up violate Wade's Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination? 2. Did the absence of counsel at the line up deprive him of his Sixth Amendment rights?
Conclusion:
1. No. 2. Yes. Neither the lineup itself nor anything required therein violated respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting his person for observation by witnesses and using his voice as an identifying physical characteristic involved no compulsion of the accused to give evidence of a testimonial nature against himself which is prohibited by that Amendment. However, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to counsel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well determine his fate and where the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial. The post-indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps as analyzing fingerprints and blood samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which respondent was entitled to the aid of counsel.
Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972)
Facts of the Case:
Jon Argersinger was a homeless man charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor in Florida. The charge carried with it a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. During the bench trial in which he was convicted and sentenced to serve ninety days in jail, Argersinger was not represented by an attorney.
Question:
Do the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a right to counsel to defendants who are accused of committing misdemeanors?
Conclusion:
Yes. In Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) the Court found that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required states to provide an attorney to indigent defendants in cases involving serious crimes. In this case, a unanimous Court extended that right to cover defendants charged with misdemeanors who faced the possibility of a jail sentence. Justice Douglas's plurality opinion described the intricacies involved in misdemeanor charges and the danger that unrepresented defendants may fall victim to "assembly-line justice." Thus, in order to guarantee fairness in trials involving potential jail time, no matter how petty the charge, the Court found that the state was obligated to provide the accused with counsel.
Rasul v. Bush (2004)
Facts of the Case:
Four British and Australian citizens were captured by the American military in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The four men were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty"). The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision.
Question:
Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba?
Conclusion:
Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the degree of control exercised by the United States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the application of habeas corpus rights. Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th century English common law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in "all...dominions under the sovereign's control." Because the United States exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was irrelevant. Further, Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizenship status. The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as unconstitutional.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004)
Facts of the Case:
In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was arrested by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an "enemy combatant," and transfered to a military prison in Virginia. Frank Dunham, Jr., a defense attorney in Virginia, filed a petition to have Hamdi's case heard in federal district court there, first on his own and then for Hamdi's father, in an attempt to have Hamdi's detention declared unconstitutional. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to due process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the executive branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States "enemy combatants" and thus restrict their access to the court system. The district court ruled for Hamdi, telling the government to release him. On appeal, a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because "the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not." The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's "enemy combatant" determination.
Question:
Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to due process by holding him indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an executive branch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to executive branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant?"
Conclusion:
Yes and no. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by two additional justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant. Souter and Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress authorized Hamdi's detention. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately.