8th Amendment Case outlines
Trop v. Dulles (1958)
Facts of the Case:
In 1944, United States Army
private Albert Trop escaped from a military stockade at Casablanca,
Morocco, following his confinement for a disciplinary violation. A day
later, Trop willingly surrendered to an army truck headed back to
Casablanca. Despite testifying that he "decided to return to the
stockade" when he was picked up, a general court martial convicted Trop
of desertion and sentenced him to three years at hard labor, loss of all
pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. In 1952, Trop applied
for a passport. His application was rejected under Section 401(g) of
the amended 1940 Nationality Act, on the ground that he lost his
citizenship due to his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime
desertion. After failing to obtain a declaratory judgment that he was a
U.S. citizen, from both a district and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, Trop appealed to the Supreme Court.
Question:
Did Section 401(g) of the amended 1940
Nationality Act (the "Act") allow for an unconstitutional punishment by
authorizing the expatriation of a citizen convicted of wartime
desertion?
Conclusion:
Yes. After finding that Section 401(g) of the amended Act was
penal in nature, since it punished convicted deserters with
denationalization, the Court held that involuntary expatriation was
barred by the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual penal remedy.
Citizenship, the Court stated, is not a license that expires upon
misbehavior. Rather, it can only be voluntarily renounced by express
language and, or, conduct. Since Trop did not involve himself in any way
with a foreign state, so as to demonstrate disloyalty to the United
States, his court martial conviction of desertion did not justify his
forced expatriation.
In 1944, United States Army
private Albert Trop escaped from a military stockade at Casablanca,
Morocco, following his confinement for a disciplinary violation. A day
later, Trop willingly surrendered to an army truck headed back to
Casablanca. Despite testifying that he "decided to return to the
stockade" when he was picked up, a general court martial convicted Trop
of desertion and sentenced him to three years at hard labor, loss of all
pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. In 1952, Trop applied
for a passport. His application was rejected under Section 401(g) of
the amended 1940 Nationality Act, on the ground that he lost his
citizenship due to his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime
desertion. After failing to obtain a declaratory judgment that he was a
U.S. citizen, from both a district and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, Trop appealed to the Supreme Court.
Question:
Did Section 401(g) of the amended 1940
Nationality Act (the "Act") allow for an unconstitutional punishment by
authorizing the expatriation of a citizen convicted of wartime
desertion?
Conclusion:
Yes. After finding that Section 401(g) of the amended Act was
penal in nature, since it punished convicted deserters with
denationalization, the Court held that involuntary expatriation was
barred by the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual penal remedy.
Citizenship, the Court stated, is not a license that expires upon
misbehavior. Rather, it can only be voluntarily renounced by express
language and, or, conduct. Since Trop did not involve himself in any way
with a foreign state, so as to demonstrate disloyalty to the United
States, his court martial conviction of desertion did not justify his
forced expatriation.
Furman v. Georgia (1972)
Facts of the Case:
Furman was burglarizing a
private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee,
and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off
and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along
with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively).
Question:
Does the imposition and carrying out of
the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion:
Yes. The Court's majority opinion, issued by the court
(instead of a single justice), held that the imposition of the death
penalty in these cases constituted unconstitutional cruel and unusual
punishment. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the
justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only
Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be
unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the
arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often
indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision
forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for
capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be
administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.
Furman was burglarizing a
private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee,
and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off
and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along
with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively).
Question:
Does the imposition and carrying out of
the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion:
Yes. The Court's majority opinion, issued by the court
(instead of a single justice), held that the imposition of the death
penalty in these cases constituted unconstitutional cruel and unusual
punishment. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the
justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only
Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be
unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the
arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often
indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision
forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for
capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be
administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.
Coker v. Georgia (1977)
Facts of the Case:
In 1974, Erlich Anthony Coker,
serving a number of sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault,
escaped from prison. He broke into a Georgia couple's home, raped the
wife, and kidnapped her, stealing the family's car. She was released
shortly thereafter without further injuries. The Georgia courts
sentenced Coker to death on the rape charge.
Question:
Was the imposition of the death penalty
for the crime of rape a form of cruel and unusual punishment forbidden
by the Eighth Amendment?
Conclusion:
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the death penalty
was a "grossly disproportionate" punishment for the crime of rape. The
Court noted that nearly all states at that time declined to impose such a
harsh penalty, with Georgia being the only state that authorized death
for the rape of an adult woman. Because rape did not involve the taking
of another human life, the Court found the death penalty excessive "in
its severity and revocability."
In 1974, Erlich Anthony Coker,
serving a number of sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault,
escaped from prison. He broke into a Georgia couple's home, raped the
wife, and kidnapped her, stealing the family's car. She was released
shortly thereafter without further injuries. The Georgia courts
sentenced Coker to death on the rape charge.
Question:
Was the imposition of the death penalty
for the crime of rape a form of cruel and unusual punishment forbidden
by the Eighth Amendment?
Conclusion:
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the death penalty
was a "grossly disproportionate" punishment for the crime of rape. The
Court noted that nearly all states at that time declined to impose such a
harsh penalty, with Georgia being the only state that authorized death
for the rape of an adult woman. Because rape did not involve the taking
of another human life, the Court found the death penalty excessive "in
its severity and revocability."
Gregg v. Georgia (1976)
Facts of the Case:
A jury found Gregg guilty of
armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its
imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining
death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a
"cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along
with Jurek v. Texas, Roberts v. Louisiana, Proffitt v. Florida, and Woodson v. North Carolina.
Question:
Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment?
Conclusion:
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of
death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all
circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has
been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and
judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully
employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and
careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding
where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury
findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the
defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances
with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to
overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment
serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate
means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.
A jury found Gregg guilty of
armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its
imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining
death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a
"cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along
with Jurek v. Texas, Roberts v. Louisiana, Proffitt v. Florida, and Woodson v. North Carolina.
Question:
Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment?
Conclusion:
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of
death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all
circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has
been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and
judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully
employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and
careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding
where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury
findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the
defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances
with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to
overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment
serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate
means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.
Roper v. Simmons (2005)
Facts of the Case:
Christopher Simmons was
sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to
state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was
rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court suspended Simmon's
execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia,
a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally ill. After the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally ill violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual
punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual,
the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.
Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided,
6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider
the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court,
citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the
death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a
majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the
court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing
a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at
"evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just
as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such
as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.
Question:
Does the execution of minors violate the
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth
Amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine
of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy,
the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing
minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death
penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the
death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the
Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the
juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.
Christopher Simmons was
sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to
state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was
rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court suspended Simmon's
execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia,
a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally ill. After the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally ill violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual
punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual,
the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.
Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided,
6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider
the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court,
citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the
death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a
majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the
court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing
a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at
"evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just
as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such
as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.
Question:
Does the execution of minors violate the
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth
Amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine
of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion:
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy,
the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing
minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death
penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the
death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the
Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the
juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.